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A methodology is presented to verify manually written 
test cases against the formal specification of a proto- 
col. Initially, a protocol and a test case are modeled as 
nondeterministic finite state machines and test case 
verification is viewed as a reachability analysis prob- 
lem. An existing reachability analysis algorithm, based 
on the well-known perturbation technique, is modified 
to take nondeterminism in protocols and special test 
case features (timeouts and OTHERWISE events) into 
account. Correctness aspects of the reachability algo- 
rithm are proved. The notion of a synchronization 
error manifesting in a test case due to the nondeter- 
ministic nature of a protocol specification is studied. 
To verify data flow aspects of test cases, we extend 
our technique by modeling the test case and protocol 
specification as extended finite state machines. A test 
case from a proprietary test suite for the transport 
protocol Class 2 is taken as an example and is shown 
to contain several design errors. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of conformance testing of a communi- 
cation protocol implementation is to verify whether 
the implementation conforms with the protocol 
speci~cation in representative instances of commu- 
nication [l I. In practice, conformance testing is done 
by applying a collection of test cases to the imple- 
mentation under test GUT) and observing the re- 
sponses of the IUT. 
The behavior of a protocol providing a set of 
communication functions is marked by sequences of 
events appearing at its service access points and 
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composed of input events to the protocol and the 
responses of the protocol in the form of output 
events. From the conformance point of view, the 
objective of a test case is to check whether the 
implementation satisfies the specification require- 
ments with respect to a protocol function. A test 
case does this checking by applying sequences of 
input events to the implementation and comparing 
the responded events with the expected events al- 
lowed by the protocol specification. If the behavior 
of the implementation is allowed by the protocol 
specification and the test objective is satisfied, then 
the test case assigns a Pass verdict. If the behavior 
of the implementation is not allowed by the protocol 
specification, then the test case assigns a Fail ver- 
dict. However, if the behavior of the implementation 
is allowed by the protocol but the test objective is 
not fulfilled, then the test case assigns an Znconcfu- 
sive verdict. Therefore, the correctness of confor- 
mance judgement of a test case depends on the 
correctness of the sequences of events input to the 
implementation and the expected protocol events 
stated in the test case. Verification of a test case 
involves comparing the test case behavior with the 
protocol behavior and discovering any design errors 
in the test case. 
Large size, nondeterministic events, combinations 
of many parameters, and communication among the 
modules of a protocol specification make the behav- 
ior of a communication protocol very complex and 
difficult to understand, Hence, manually designing a 
set of test cases to test an implementation of a 
protocol is not a trivial task. Those manually written 
test cases may contain many design errors. Thus, it is 
essential to have a methodolo~ to verify test cases 
against a protocol specification. 
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Since the late 1970s when researchers developed 
techniques to formally specify communication proto- 
cols, the notions of protocol validation and verifica- 
tion have been widely studied [2]. The techniques 
used in validating a protocol are reachability analy- 
sis, duologue-matrix analysis, and symbolic execution 
[3-61. Similarly, a number of techniques have been 
used to verify protocols depending on whether the 
protocols are specified using finite state machines 
(FSMS), programming languages, or temporal logic. 
A list of references to various protocol verification 
techniques appears in [71 which discusses an algo- 
rithmic technique for verifying protocols described 
using FSMs and propositional temporal logic. In this 
article, we study the test case verification problem 
using a reachability analysis technique. 
An outline of the verification methodology pre- 
sented here is as follows. In the test verification 
system, a test case and a protocol specification are 
modeled as nondeterministic FSMs, called T-FSM 
and P-FSM, respectively. Each point of control and 
observation (PC01 is modeled as two unidirectional 
channels. The verification process consists of two 
phases. In the first phase, a perturbation technique 
is used to generate all the reachable global states in 
the verification system, where each global state con- 
sists of the states of the individual FSMs and the 
channel states. In the second phase, the global state 
space is analyzed for various errors, such as unspeci- 
fied reception, tempoblocking, deadlock, livelock, 
channel overflow, and synchronization errors. 
Real protocols have complicated functionalities 
with higher expressive power in the form of a set of 
parameter values associated with each protocol event 
and a capability to check the appropriateness of the 
received parameters using predicates. To demon- 
strate the application of the reachability analysis 
technique in verifying test cases against real proto- 
cols, we model a test case and a protocol specifica- 
tion by extended finite state machines (EFSM). 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In 
section 2, we model a local single-layer (LS) [ll 
architecture-based test case and the formal descrip- 
tion of a protocol as nondeterministic FSMs and use 
a perturbation algorithm to generate the global state 
space, which is then analyzed to detect various test 
design errors. Synchronization errors occurring in a 
test case due to nondeterministic behavior of a 
protocol are studied in section 3. We enhance the 
verification methodology to extended FSM represen- 
tations of test cases and protocols in section 4. In 
section 5, we present an example of verifying a test 
case using its FSM and EFSM models. Two other 
test verification approaches are summarized in sec- 
tion 6. Finally, conclusions are stated in section 7. 
2. TEST VERIFICATION USING FSM MODELS 
In this section, we introduce simple models of proto- 
cols and test cases and present a test architecture. 
Then we define some terms, present a reachability 
analysis algorithm, and analyze some theoretical 
properties of the algorithm. Finally, we apply the 
algorithm to a test case to generate a reachability 
graph and analyze the graph for various design 
errors in the test case. 
We model a protocol as a nondeterministic FSM 
asynchronously interacting with the test system. Be- 
cause of the asynchronous nature of communication, 
an interaction point between the protocol FSM and 
the test system is modeled as two unidirectional 
channels. 
A test case must have alternative behavior and 
timeout mechanisms to test nondeterministic proto- 
cols, have loops to repeatedly apply test events if the 
implementation does not respond in expected time, 
have an OTHERWISE as an alternative receive 
event to capture all unintended events, and have a 
test verdict depending on each alternative outcome 
of the test purpose. Thus, test cases can be modeled 
as nondeterministic FSMs. 
An abstract testing mechanism must be able to 
control the IUT and observe its responses at points 
known as the points of control and observations 
(PCOs). From a practical point of view, depending 
on the availability of the PCOs, the test mechanism 
can be either local or external [l]. The definition of 
an abstract test architecture requires that the PCOs 
be distributed over two abstract testing functions, 
the upper tester (UT) and the lower tester (LT). The 
LT provides control and observations at the appro- 
priate PC0 either below the IUT or remote from 
the IUT. The UT provides control and observation 
at the upper service boundary during test execution. 
In the LS architecture, behavior of a test case can be 
either separated into LT and UT behavior or speci- 
fied in an in-line monolithic structure as shown in 
Figure la. Distributed single-layer CDS), coordinated 
single-layer (CS), and remote single-layer (RS) test 
systems are examples of external test architectures. 
We assume that the test cases are specified in LS 
architecture; if not, then they can be converted into 
this form. 
2.1 Notations and Definitions 
An external event in an FSM is characterized by 
three parameters: PCOs, direction (“?” denotes an 
input and “!” denotes an output), and the message in 
the event. However, no channel or direction is asso- 
ciated with an internal event. In a test case FSM the 
stadtimer), canceZ(timer), and timedtimer) con- 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 1. LS architecture-based test system (a); verifica- 
tion system for LS architecture (b). 
stitute the internal events. In a protocol specifica- 
tion, nondeterminism is a way of modeling real-time 
properties of and the effect of the environment, 
particularly the service provider, on the communica- 
tion system. Notationally, an unobservable transition 
or internal event (i event) is used to represent 
nondeterminism in a protocol model. 
A transition in an FSM is characterized by four 
parameters: porn and to states, went, and prior@. 
To take care of the semantics of an OTHERWISE, 
a priority number is associated with each transition 
in a set of alternative transitions such that priority 
decreases from top to bottom. In a protocol FSM, all 
the transitions in a state are assigned the same 
priority. 
We use function notations to access the parame- 
ters of events and transitions. For example, dir(E) 
returns the direction field in the event E, pco(E) 
returns the PC0 of the event E, and porn(r) re- 
turns the from state of transition r. The functions 
int(E) and at(E) return a true value if E is an 
internal event and an external event, respectively. 
To extract the first message in a channel channelLid, 
we use the notation head(channel_id). 
A communicating FSM consists of a set of states, 
a set of transitions, an initial state, a set of final 
states, a set of input channels, and a set of output 
.___~. _.._.-. 
function nv(ov, pv) { 
if (ov = = “none” then return 
else ( 
of LI - State of T-FS 
State 
K 
of Lo-) State of P-FSM 
--) Indicates the possible direction of message flow in the system. 
Figure 2. Structure of a global state in the LS architec- 
ture-based test verification system shown in Figure 1. 
channels. Verdicts in a test case FSM are stored as 
tags of the states. The function Ezrdict( s> returns the 
verdict tag of the state s. The present and next 
states of an FSM M are denoted by ps(M) and 
ns(M), respectively. The OTHERWISE is abbrevi- 
ated as OTH. 
Definition I: Test r!er@cation Jystem. A test verifi- 
cation system (TVS) is defined to be a 3-tuple, 
TVS = (T, P, C), where T is the test case FSM, P 
is the protocol FSM, and C is the set of channels 
connecting T and P. 
Ex~m~ie. The LS architecture and the corre- 
sponding test verification system are shown in Figure 
1. A test case is modeled as a T-FSM. the protoco1 
specification is modeled as a P-FSM, and each of the 
PCOs (L and U) is modeled by two unidirectional 
channels. 
Definition 2: Global state. The global state g of a 
test verification system TVS = XT, P. C) is defined 
as 
g E G c {stufes( T) X sfutes( P) x sfutes( Lf ) x .stute.s( LO) 
X states( UI) X stutes( UO) X Verdicts}. 
Example. The structure of the global states for 
the LS architecture-based test verification system in 
Figure 1 is shown in Figure 2. 
The function hew-~?erdict~oLd t$erdict, present rler- 
diet), abbreviated as nr(otx, pr!) is used to compute 
the new verdict as follows: 
if (ov = = Fail) or (pv = = Fail) then return(Fail) 
else if (ov = = Pass) and (pv = = Inconclusive) then retum(Inconclusive1 
else if (ov = = Inconc.) and (pv = = Inconc.) then return(Inconclusive) 
else if (ov = = Pass) and (pv = = Pass) then return(Pass) 
I 
end 
De~~i~io~ 3: Exe~~fab~e transitions. The set of 
executable transitions ET occurring in the present 
~__~ .- .-----~ _ ._-. .-. .--. i^ 
global state g = (ps(T), ps(P), ps(LI), 
ps(LU), ps(UII. ps~U~j, tl) in a test veri~cation sys- 
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tern 7’KS = (T, P, C) is expressed as ET(g,) = ETP(g,) u ETT(g,), where 
ETP(g,) = {r = (From,To, E, Priority)((fiom(r) = =ps(P)) A 
((int(E) v 
(at(E) A (dir(E) = = !)) V 
(e.xt(E) A (dir(E) = = ?) A (pco(E) = = L) A (message(E) = = head(L0))) V 
(e&(E) A (dir(E) = = ?) A (x0(E) = = U) A (message(E) = = head(U0))) 
ETT(g,) is computed as follows. Initially, E77XgJ = 4, R = Mjkm(r> = =ps(T))f, and j~~f-p~o~~ = 0, 
L_fzag = False, U$ag = False. 
While R + 4 begin { 
init_priority = init_priority + 1 
for r E RKpriority(r) = = init_priority) begin { 
if (int(E) v (ext(E) A (dir(E) = = !))) then {ETT(g,) = ETT(g,,) U 
{r), R = R - rJ 
if (at(E) A (pco(E) = = L) A (dir(E) = = ?> A (message(E) = = 
heud(LZ)) A (I&g = = Fake)) then {ETT(g,) = ETT(g,) u id, R = 
R - r, L-flag = True) 
if ((~e~suge(~) = = OTH) A (pco(E) = = 15) A (co~~e~~t .U) + 
~$1 A (L_ftag = False)) then {ETT(g,) = ETT(g,) U id, R = R - r, L&g = 
True} 
if (e&(E) A (pco(E) = = U) A (dir(E) = = ?) A (message(E) = = 
head( A (Kftag = = False)) then b!3’T(g,) = ETT(g,) U {r), R = 
R - r, U-flag = True) 
if 
((message(E) = = OTH) A (pco(E) = = u) A (content # 4) A u&g = 
Fdse)) then {ETT(gJ = ETT(g,) U {r), R = R - r, U-flag = True) 
1 
De~~~tio~ 4: Pe~~bat~o~. Let gr, = ( ps(T),ps( PI, pd Lf), ps( LO), p&M), ps(~U), v) be the present global 
state of a test verification system 776 = (T, P, C>. Then, the perturbation of gP by an executable transition 
r = (From, To, E, Priority> E ET(gJ is written as pe~urbatio~(g~, r) = g, such that if r is a transition in T 
and verdict(To) = pv, then 
g, = (7i,,ps(~),ps(LI),ps(LO),ps(UI),ps(UO), n~‘(~:,pu))ifint(E) OR 
(To,ps(P),ns(LZ),ps(LO),ps(UZ),ps(UO),n~l(c,pu)) #(dir(E) = = ?) A 
(pco( E) = = L) A ((message(E) = head( LZ)) V ( message(E) = = 5TH) A (LZ f 4)) OR 
(7o,ps(P),ps(LZ),ns(LO),ps(UZ),ps(UO),nu(u,pu)) if(dir(E) = = !) A (pco(E) = = L) OR 
(To,ps(P),ps(LZ),ps(LO),m(UZ),ps(U5),nr:(c,p~)) if(dir(E) = = ?) A 
(pm{ E) = = U) A (messuge( E) = heud(UZ) v (mesmge( E) = = OTH) A (UZ f 4)) OR 
(To,ps(P),ps(LZ),ps(LO),ps(UZ),ns(UO),n~(v,pc)~ ~(~~r(~) = = !) A (pco(E) == f-9. 
Else 
g, = 
if r is a transition in P, then 
(ps(T),To,ps(LZ),ps(LO),ps(UZ),ps(UO),n~(u,p~)~ ifWE) 5R 
(ps(T),To,n~(LZ),ps(LO),ps(UZ),ps(UO),nu(t~,p~)) if(dir(E) == !) A 
(pco(E) = = L); OR 
(ps(T),To,ps(LZ),ns(LO),ps(UZ),ps(UO),nu(u,pu)) if(dir(E) = = ?) A 
(pco(E) = = L) A (message(E) = head(l0)); OR 
(ps(T),To,p~(LZ),ps(LO),ns(UZ),ps(UO),nu(u,pu)) $(&r(E) = = !) A 
(pco(E) = = U) OR 
(ps(T),To,ps(LI),ps(LO),ps(UZ),ns(UO),nv(c,p~)) if(dir(E) = = ?) A 
(pco(E) = = U) A (message = = beam). 
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In the following definitions, C = (LZ, LO, UZ, UO}, 
S,, is the set of final states in the T-FSM, S,, is the 
set of final states in the P-FSM, Gf is the set of final 
states of the global state space G. 
2.2 Reachability Analysis Algorithm 
We modify the reachability analysis algorithm for 
protocol validation [3], so that the modified algo- 
rithm can handle the following features of the test 
verification model: (I) internal events, priorities in a 
set of alternative events, OTHERWISE events, and 
verdicts in T-FSM; and (2) internal events in P-FSM. 
It is assumed that each channel is bounded. Pertur- 
bation of a global state is stopped if a channel 
overflow error, defined below, is detected. 
Definition 5: Channel ove$ow error. An over- 
flow error in a global state g = ( ps(T), 
ps(P), ps(LZ), ps(LO), ps(UZ), ps(UO), v> is defined 
as channeZoverJEow(g) = ((content > 
capaci&(LZ)) V (content(L0) > capacity(L0)) V 
(content (UZ) > capacity(UZ)) V (content(U0) > 
capacity(UO))), where capacity(Q) is a parameter 
representing the maximum number of messages in 
the FIFO queue Q. 
Algorithm 1. 
Input: a T-FSM, a P-FSM, and the communication 
channels and their capacities. 
Output: a global state space. 








Define a set of global states G and a set of 
global transitions R. Initially, G contains only 
the initial global state g, and R = 4. 
Find a member g, E G of the set of global 
states whose perturbations have not been deter- 
mined. If no such member exists, then termi- 
nate. 
Calculate the set of executable transitions 
ET(g,J in state g, using Definition 3. 
Compute Gp, a set of global states, by perturb- 
ing gp. Initially Gp = 4. 
Vr E ET(g,){G, = G, Uperturbation(g,, r) A 
R = R U {(g,, perturbation(g,, r), 
eoent(r), priority(r)>} 
1. 
If G, is an empty set, report g, as a terminal 
state in the global state space. 
Vg E Gp begin{ 
channelover$ow(g) + mark g “perturbed” and 
G + G u {g) 
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elseif g P G + mark g “unperturbed” and G 
+- G u {g} 
1. 
S7. Go to step S2. 
In the following, we establish the termination and 
soundness properties and analyze the computational 
complexity of the algorithm. 
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 terminates. 
Proof: The proof is done by showing that no infi- 
nite branch can be generated by the algorithm. 
Proof by contradiction is used here. Assume that the 
algorithm generates an infinite branch in the global 
state space. Referring to step S2, the algorithm does 
not perturb an already perturbed global state. 
Therefore, all the states in the infinite branch must 
be distinct. However, referring to the definition of a 
global state (Definition 21, since the FSMs are finite 
and the channels are bounded, no infinite number of 
distinct global states can be generated. Hence, the 
generation of an infinite branch is not possible. q 
Theorem 2. All the global states generated by the 
algorithm are reachable from the initial global state. 
ProojI The proof is done by induction on the 
generated global states as follows. 
Basis: the initial system state g, consists of all the 
initial states of the constituent FSMs and empty 
channels. Hence, the initial global state is reach- 
able. 
Hypothesis: assume that a global state g, is reach- 
able from the initial state g,. 
Induction: let Gp be the set of global states gener- 
ated by perturbing Gp. Step S4 of Algorithm 1 
generates a state s E Gp by perturbing g,, where 
perturbation of g, is defined as the firing of a 
single executable transition in one FSM in the 
verification system. Hence all members of Gp 
are reachable from g,. 17 
The size of the state space is proportional to the 
product of the state spaces of the T-FSM and the 
P-FSM, the number of nondeterministic loops in the 
FSMs, and the channel capacities. Explosion of the 
global state space is limited by the fact that a T-FSM 
is much smaller in size than a P-FSM, as one test 
case does not test all the protocol functions. 
2.3 Analysis of Global State Space and Test Case 
Verification 
We define the types of errors expected to be present 
in the global state space, in addition to channel 
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overflow errors defined in subsection 2.2, and discuss 
the issues involved in test verdict analysis. 
2,3.1 Types of errors in the global state space. 
Definition 6. Unspecified reception error. An un- 
specified reception error (URE) in a globaf state g 
is defined as Up = (g is not a terminating 
state) A (3~ E Cf(- empty A (c 4 C,)), where 
C, = {cha~nel(r)Kdir(r) = = ?) A ((r is a transition 
in state g) V (r is reachable from g after a se- 
quence of internal transitions))}. 
Definition 7: Deadlock error. A deadlock in a 
global state g = (ps(T), ps(P), ps(LI), 
ps( LO), ps(VZ), ps(lJO), u > is defined as 
deadlock(g) = (g E Gf) A (ps(T) @ STf) A (ps(P) 
% S,,> A (Vc E C(emp~(c))). 
De~nition 8: flocking reception error. A blocking 
reception in a global state g = (ps(T), ps(P), 
ps(LI), ps(LO), ps(Uf), ps(UO), v> is defined as foi- 
lows: blocking(g) = (g E G,) A (!ic E 
Cl1 empty(c)). 
Definition 9: Tempo-blocking error (livelock). A 
livelock in a globai state space G is defined as 
livelock = 3 a cycle in G. 
2.3.2 Test verdict ana~s~s. The final global states 
can be classified into two categories: one category of 
final states, called erroneous states, represents dead- 
lock, blocking reception, and channel overflow er- 
rors; the other category of final states are error free. 
Theorem 3. Assuming that the P-FSM does not 
contain any transition for exception handling, an 
error-free terminating global state must have a Puss 
or an Inconclusive verdict, 
Proof The proof is done by contradiction. As- 
sume that an error-free terminating global state has 
a Fail verdict. An error-free terminating global state 
means both the T-FSM and the P-FSM are in their 
Test event 
at PC0 L (U) 
A 
A test OUTPUT 
event at L (U) may 
face a sync. error 
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final states and the channels are empty. That is, the 
test behavior leading to the error-free terminating 
global state is allowed by the P-FSM behavior. 
Hence, the error-free terminating global state can- 
not end in a Fail verdict. Thus, it must end in a Pass 
or an Inconclusive verdict. q 
Corollas 1. A Pass/Inco~cl~s~e verdict in a T- 
FSM is incorrect iff the verdict is attached to an 
erroneous state. 
Corollary 2. A Fail verdict in a T-FSM is correct 
iff the verdict does not appear in any of the error-free 
states. 
According to Theorem 3, it is possible to verify a 
Fail verdict. However, to verify a Pass or an Incon- 
clusiue verdict in a test case, the test purpose must 
be taken into account. 
The purpose of a test case can be expressed as a 
regular expression on the interactions of the P- and 
T-FSMs. The global state space should accept the 
regular expression and terminate in an error-free 
state which has a Pass verdict. All other error-free 
states must have an Inconclusive verdict. 
3. SYNCHRONIZATION ERRORS IN A TEST CASE 
The issue of synchronization in a test case, an event 
timing problem, was first studied using a determinis- 
tic FSM model of a protocol specification IS]. With 
such a model of a protocol, a test case faces a 
synchronization problem if, in a sequence of two test 
events, the second event sends a message to the 
protocol through the PC0 L (U), whereas the first 
event does not involve PC0 L (U). 
In this section, we present a general notion of 
synchronization error and enumerate the protocol 
specification behavior resulting in a synchronization 
error in a test case. Referring to Figure 3, let a test 
event (input or output) occur at PC0 U (L) at time 
t,,, let t, be the time instant for a test event to be 
output at the same PC0 U CL), and let S be a 
sequence of test events occurring in the interval 
) Time 
Test events at PC0 U (L) ___+ 
and internal events or Null 
to actions. tl 
Figure 3. The context of an event facing a synchronization error. 
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(t,,-t,) such that S includes only internal test events 
and events occurring at the other PC0 L (U). 
Therefore, conceptually, the output test event at 
PC0 U (L) at time t, faces a synchronization prob- 
lem if the length of the interval (t,-t,) is indetermi- 
nate. In the following, we enumerate three cases of 
protocol behavior making the interval (t,-t,) inde- 
terminate. 
The test case behavior in the interval (lo-t,) 
corresponds to the protocol specification behavior 
{i, L!PDU} (Ii, U!PDU}). 
The test case behavior in the interval (t,-t,) 
corresponds to the protocol specification behavior 
(L?PDUl, L! PDU2} ((U?PDlJl, U! PDU2)) or 
{L?PDUl, Null action) ({U?PDUl, Null action}). 
The test case behavior in the interval (t,,-t,) 
corresponds to the protocol specification behavior 
(i, Null action). 
A null action means the protocol specification 
does not produce any event at the PCOs in response 
to the preceding input or internal event. Referring 
to Figure 5, the effect of receiving an acknowledg- 
ment PDU in state 10 is a null action taken by the 
protocol. The first two cases above are applicable to 
both the nondeterministic FSM and EFSM models 
of a protocol and the third case is applicable only to 
an EFSM model of a protocol where a null action 
means an action updating internal protocol variables 
and not generating any event at a PCO. 
Note that the second case above is the source of a 
synchronization error in a test case involving a de- 
terministic FSM model of a protocol studied in [8]. 
Therefore, the notion of a synchronization error 
studied here is a general one encompassing both 
deterministic and nondeterministic FSM and EFSM 
models of protocols. 
In the following, a synchronization error is for- 
mally defined. 
Definition 10: First output successor (fos). In the 
global state space G, there are two types of transi- 
tions: protocol specification transitions (p-transi- 
tions) and test case transitions (t-transitions). A t- 
transition tr2 = (From2, To2, E2, Pr2) is the first 
output successor of another t-transition trl = 
(Froml, Tel, El, Prl), written (tr2 =fos(trl)) iff 
((tr2 is the first output t-transition following trl) A 
(pco(El) = =pco(E2)) A (dir(E2) = = !)). 
Definition II: Synchronization error. In a global 
state space G, a synchronization error is defined as 
syncerr = 3 trl = (Froml, Tol, El, Prl) and 
tr2 = (From2, To2, E2, Pr2)l((tr2 = = fos(trl) A 
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(all the global states between the states fiom(trl) 
and to(tr2) are error-free)) A (the sequence of tran- 
sitions between trl and tr2 contains p-transitions 
with events (i, E3) or (E4, E3/null~, or (i, null), 
where ((dir(E3) = = !> A ((pco(E3) # pco(E2))), 
((dir( E4) = = ?) A ((pco(E4) f pco(E2))). 
A null transition appears only in the extended 
FSM model of a protocol and represents actions 
updating the variables of an extended FSM with no 
external protocol event taking place. 
Though a synchronization error appears in a test 
case, it is not always possible to detect such an error 
by analyzing only the test case FSM, because the 
errors are caused by some inherent behavior of the 
protocol specification. Moreover, in some instances, 
while analyzing a test FSM, a sequence of events 
seems to represent a synchronization error, but a 
comparison of the behavior of the test case with the 
protocol FSM indicates that the event sequence 
causes an unspecified reception error and not a 
synchronization error. Therefore, for detecting syn- 
chronization errors and separating them from other 
types of errors, it is necessary to analyze the global 
state space of the test verification system. 
4. TEST VERIFICATION USING EFSM MODELS 
OF TEST CASES AND PROTOCOLS 
An EFSM model of a protocol is distinct from an 
FSM model in two respects: (1) an event exchanged 
between two EFSM entities is composed of a set of 
protocol parameters such as addressing, sequencing, 
flow control, and error detection information, in 
addition to the actual user data to be sent or re- 
ceived, and (2) in the EFSM model, individual com- 
ponent parameters in a receive event can be checked 
for the desired operation of the protocol. 
A communicating EFSM is a eight-tuple, EX = 
(S, V, R, sO, Sf, h,, I,, Oc), where S is a finite set 
of states, I’ is a finite set of identifiers-analogous 
to the variables and constants in a programming 
language-to hold values, so is the initial state of 
EX, S, c S is a set of final states of EX, h, is a set 
of initialization functions, I, is the set of input 
channels from which EX receives messages, and 0, 
is the set of output channels into which EX puts 
messages for communicating with other EFSMs. 
An external event in an EFSM is a four-tuple, 
E = (channel, direction, message identifier, list of pa- 
rameters). For example, L?CR( Psrc-ref, Pdst-ref, 
Poptionl, PRcredit) is an event, where L is the 
channel name, ? is the input direction, CR is the 
PDU name, and (Psrc-ref, Pdst_ref, Poptionl, PR- 
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credit) is the list of parameter values received in the 
CR PDU. 
A transition in an EFSM is represented by a 
six-tuple, r = (From, To, Euent, Predicate, Assign- 
ments, Priority), where the transition takes the EFSM 
from the From state to the To state if Predicate 
(Predicate : V --) (True, False)) evaluates to true; then 
a set of value assignments is done in the Assignment 
clause, which is a set of functions <f, : 1/ --+ V). We 
denote a protocol EFSM and a test case EFSM us 
P-~FS~ and T-EFSM, respe~tiue~y. 
In the context of an EFSM, the definition of the 
set of executable transitions (Definition 3) in a global 
state is extended to account for the predicates in the 
EFSM’s transitions. 
Definition 12: Executable transitions. The set of 
executable transitions XET(g,J occurring in the 
present global state g, is given by the following 
expression: XET(g,) = {rir E ET(gpI A 
predicate(r) = Tkuef, where ET(g,,) is computed us- 
ing Definition 3. 
4.1 Modeling a Protocol as an EFSM 
A P-EFSM can be obtained from the P-FSM model 
used in section 2. The FSM model is extended with 
the addition of a list of parameters for each ASP 
(Abstract Service Primitive) and PDU. A number of 
identifiers and constraint values are also defined. 
FSM transitions are modified in the following man- 
ner to obtain EFSM transitions. If the Event in a 
transition is a receive event then, first, a predicate 
denoting the enabling condition is added as a com- 
ponent of the EFSM transition. Next, the values of 
the EFSM’s variables are updated by assigning val- 
ues of the received parameters to the variables of 
the EFSM. These assignments are added to the 
Assignment component of the P-EFSM transition. If 
the Event is a send event, then the event parameters 
are assigned variable or constant values. An en- 
abling condition can also be associated with an 
EFSM transition containing a send event. 
4.2 Modeling a Test Case as an EFSM 
In section 2, a test case designed to test a nondeter- 
ministic protocol was modeled as a nondeterministic 
FSM. As protocol events are parameterized and 
mechanisms to check values of those parameters are 
introduced in the form of transition predicates re- 
sulting in an EFSM description of a protocol, an 
event in a test case must also be parameterized with 
mechanisms to assign values to those parameters, 
and provisions must be there to put constraints on 
events. The structure of a complete event line in a 
test case is shown below. 
L!CR Assignments Boolean-condition 
Label Constraint Verdict 
A constraint on a send event is interpreted as a 
set of assignments of values to the parameters of the 
event being sent; a constraint on a receive event is 
interpreted as a set of boolean conditions on the 
values of the parameters received in the event. The 
above send event line can be modeled as an EFSM 
transition: (From, To, L!CR, boo~eu~-condition, 
( Assignment and Constraint), Priori& >, where From, 
To, and Priority are dependent on the context of the 
event line in the test case. Applying this process to 
all event lines, we obtain the T-EFSM [9]. 
4.3 Reachability Analysis of EFSMs 
Algorithm 1 was designed to generate the global 
state space of the combined behavior of a test case 
and a protocol modeled as FSMs. Using Definition 
3, step 53 of the algorithm, computes the set of 
executable transitions ET(g,) in the present global 
state g, and step 54 perturbs g,, by using ET(g,,). 
The same algorithm can be used to generate the 
global state space of a test case and a protocol 
modeled as EFSMs by using Definition 12 of the set 
of executable transitions in the global state g,. 
The global state space generated from the EFSM 
models of a protocol and a test case differs from 
that generated from the FSM models in that it 
contains two additional fields of information-as- 
signment of values to parameters and transition 
predicate. These additional fields are kept as parts 
of the transitions as explained in Figure 4. 
5. VERIFICATION EXAMPLE 
In this section, we demonstrate the application of 
the test case verification methodology. In section 5.1, 
we take the FSM models of a simplified transport 





Next giobal state( sr 
Figure 4. Global state and transition structures in the 
global state space of EFSM models. 
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using the methodology discussed in section 2. In 
section 5.2, we consider the EFSM models of the 
same protocol specification and test case and show 
how reachability analysis can be used to verify a test 
case described as an EFSM. 
5.1 Reachability Analysis Using FSM Models 
To show an application of the verification process, 
an FSM description of a simplified class 2 transport 
protocol, a test case, the global state space, and 
analysis of the global state space are presented 
below. 
5.1.1 A si~pli~ed transpo~ protocol. A nondeter- 
ministic FSM model of a class 2 transport protocol 
[lo], called P-FSM, is shown in Figure 5; it can 
handle one transport connection. State 1 is both the 
initial and the final state of the FSM and represents 
a closed connection. State 10 corresponds to an 
open connection state. If the connection establish- 
ment procedure is initiated by the user of the trans- 
port entity, then the FSM moves from state 1 to 10 
through the states (1, 2, 3, 4, 101 and if the connec- 
tion is established by the peer entity, then the FSM 
moves from state 1 to 10 through {l, 5, 6, 7, 10). 
There are two internal transitions in the FSM. One 
internal transition from state 10 to 11 models the 
effect of the environment on the protocol specifica- 
tion leading to a disconnection of the transport 
connection along the state sequence {lo, 11, 12, 9, 
1). The other internal transition from state 10 to 18 
models the acknowledgement (AK) transmission 
policies, including timeouts. 
5.1.2 A test case for basic interconnection test. For 
verification purposes, we choose a test case for basic 
interconnection test from a real test suite developed 
at the National Computing Center (NCC) [II]. Since 
the NCC test suite is in the CS architecture, we 
rewrite the test case from CS to LS architecture 
using informations in the test management protocol 
used by the test suite. The architectural transforma- 
tion of the test case is done manually and is shown 
in a TI’CN-like notation in Figure 6. In the test case, 
a sequence of test events is represented one line 
after the other, each new event indented once from 
left to right, as time is assumed to progress. Test 
events at the same level of indentation and belong- 
ing to the same predecessor event represent the 
possible alternative events occurring at that time. 
Based on these notions of sequence and alternative 
events, the FSM description of the test case, called 
the T-FSM, is shown in Figure 7. 
The test case contains many possible alternative 
test scenarios depending on how the implementation 
behaves. However, info~ally, the objective of the 
test case is to establish a connection, send a DT 
PDU, receive an AK for the sent DT, and close the 
connection. In terms of test events, the test purpose 
is represented by the regular expression {L!CR. 
U?TCONind. U!TCONresp. L?CC. L!DT. 
~?T~ATAind. L?AK. L!DR. ~?T~I~~ind. L?DC). 
This expression will be used while analyzing test 
verdicts. 
5.1.3 Generation and analysis of global state space, 
In this example, all the channel capacities are as- 
sumed to be two. The initial global state is (1, 1, E, 
E, E, E, Null), where the first 1 is the initial state of 
T-FSM, the second 1 is the initial state of P-FSM, E 
represents the empty states of the channels, and 
Null represents that no verdict is associated with the 
initial global state. Applying Algorithm 1, we obtain 
the global state space shown in the Appendix. The 
initial global state is perturbed by the transition 
L!CR in the T-FSM generating global state 2. Then, 
global state 2 is perturbed by transition Start(A) in 
the T-FSM and L?CR in the P-FSM generating 
global states 3 and 4, respectively. This way, possible 
perturbations of the global states continue. 
Three types of errors-unspecified reception er- 
ror, blocking reception error, and channel overflow 
error-are found in the global state space shown in 
the Appendix. The occurrences of these errors to- 
gether with their implications on the test case are 
discussed below. 
Unspecified reception error. Global state 52 corre- 
sponds to T-FSM state 6, P-FSM state 12, LI con- 
Figure 5. FSM description of a class 2 transport protocol. 
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tainin~ CC, UI ~ntainin~ ~D~~~~~, and other chan- 
nels empty. That is, there are two messages-CC 
and TDZSind-in the input queues of T-FSM, but 
T-FSM has no transition in state 6 to receive the 
TDISind from channel UI. Therefore, global state 52 
indicates that there is an unspecified reception error 
in state 6 of the T-FSM. An analysis of the situation 
yields that the T-FSM faces an unspecified reception 
error because of the P-FSM’s nondeterministic tran- 
sition from state 10 to 11, i.e., nondeterministi~ 
initiation of disconnection by the protocol entity. 
Blocking reception error. Global state 68 corre- 
sponds to T-FSM state 12, P-FSM state 9, L1 con- 
taining DR, UI containing TDISind, and UO con- 
taining a DT. Since there are nonemp~ communi- 
cation channels and no transitions are possible from 




P = Pass verdict 
F = Fail verdict 
I = Inconclusive verdict 
Figure 7. FSM description of test case in Figure 6. 
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blocking reception error in global state 68 is more 
complex than the unspecified reception error in state 
52 in that to detect the cause of the error we have to 
go backward from state 68. The error in state 68 is 
due to two unspecified reception errors in states 20 
and 61. That is, the errors in states 20 and 61 
propagate forward in the state space and eventually 
represent a blocking reception error in state 68. 
Other global states representing blocking reception 
errors are 36, 50, 57, 87, and 100. 
Channel ove$ow error. Any channel with more 
than two messages represents a channel overflow 
error. Global states 76, 77, 81, 302, and 105 repre- 
sent channel overflow error. In all these instances, 
the error is in channel LZ and is caused by the 
nondeterministic generation of AK PDUs in the 
P-FSM. Because of a channel overflow error, a test 
FSM can not be judged to be erroneous, because a 
communication channel neither reflects the behavior 
of a test case nor is controlled by a test case. 
All the errors appearing due to nondeterministic 
generation of events by the protocol entity can be 
eliminated by using the notion of a background 
default tree [12] facility in the test case to capture 
nondeterministically generated PDUs that can nei- 
ther be forced nor ignored. 
__- -._- 
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Test purpose and verdict analysis. In the global 
state space, there are two error-free states, 42 and 
108. Both the test behavior {L!CR, Start(A), 
U?TCONind, U!TCONresp, L?CC, Cancel(A), 
L!DT, U?TDATAind, L?AK, L!DR, U?TDISind, 
L?DC} and (L!CR, Stat-d A), L?DR} leading to global 
states 42 and 108, respectively, are accepted by the 
protocol specification. However, state 42 ends in a 
Pass verdict and state 108 ends in an ~~conc~~i~e 
verdict. To verify if the verdicts are correct, the test 
purpose regular expression is taken into account. 
Since the test behavior leading to global state 42 
satisfies the test purpose regular expression, the 
assignment of a Pass verdict is correct. Since the 
test behavior leading to global state 108 does not 
satisfy the test purpose regular expression, assign- 
ment of an Znconclusiue verdict is also correct. 
5.2 Reachability Analysis Using EFSM Models 
5.2.1 EFSM model of the protocol. We extend the 
P-FSM given in Figure 5 in three steps. In step 1, 
ASPS used to interact with a transport layer and the 
PDUs used in the transport layer are specified with 
parameters, as shown below. 
TCONreq( dst-addr, proposed-options), TCONind( src-addr , proposed-options), 
T~ONresp~ ds-addr , proposed-options) , TCON~onf ( src-addr , Accepted-options) , 
T~ISreq( dst_ref ), TDrSind( src-addr, reason), TDATAreq( dst-ref, user-data, EOT), 
TDATAind( src_ref, user-data, EOT), 
CR( src_ref, dst_ref, credit, options), CC( src-ref, dst-ref, credit, options), 
AK(src_ref, dst_ref, credit, expseqno), DC(src-ref, dst-ref 1, 
DT(src-ref, dst-ref, tpdu-number, EOT, user-data), DR( src-ref, dst_ref, reason). 
.- 
In step 2, the following identifiers arc defined to 
save variable and constant values. 
PTRseq : Expected sequence number in a received DT, 
PTSseq : Sequence number in a DT to be sent, 
Poptions : The set of options implemented in the protocol, 
PRcredit : Credit received from the peer, 
Poptionl : options received in a TCoNreq, 
Poption:! : options received in a CR, 
PScredit : Credit to be sent to the peer. 
Poption.? : options received in a CC, Finally, in step 3 the transitions are extended by 
adding predicates and assignments. The following 
Poption4 : options received in a TCONresp, are some of the transitions in the P-EFSM. 
Initialization: Psrc-ref = “spec,” Pdst-ref = “tester”, PRcredit = 1. 
( 1, 5, L?CR(src_ref, dst_ref, Poptim& PScredit), [ Pdst_ref = = src_ref & Psrc-ref = = dst-ref ],O , I> 
(5,h, ~!TCONind( Pdst_ref, Poption2), T, q , 1) 
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{6,7, U?TC~Nresp~dst-ref, Poption4), [ dsf-ref = = Pdst_ref 1, [ PTRseq = PTSseq = 01, 1) 
(7, 10, L!CC( Psrc_ref, Pdst_ref, Poption4, PRcredit), T, CI, 1) 
(10, 11, i, T, [Reason = y], 1) 
(11, 12, U!TDISind(Reason), T, •I , 1) 
(12,9, L!DR(Psrc_ref, Pdst_ref, Reason), T, 0, 1) 
(13,9, L!DR(Psrc-ref, Pdst_ref, Reasonl), T, U, 1) 
(9, 1, L?DC(src_ref, dst-ref), [src_ref = = Pdst_ref&dst_ref = = Psrc-ref], T, U, l> 
(10,14, L?DR(src_ref, dst_ref, Reason2), T, [7,1) 
(14,15, ~!TD~S~~d(Reaso~2), T, [3, 1) 
(15,1, L!DC(Psrc-ref, Pdst_ref),T, CI, 1) 
(10,18, i, T, E3,1> 
(18,10, L!AK(Psrc_ref, Pdst-ref, PTRseq, PRcredit), T, U, 1) 
(10, 17, L?DT(src_ref, dst-ref, Seq, EOT, Data), [src_ref = = Pdsf_ref &dst_ref = = Psrc_ref 
AND PRcredit( >O & Seq = = PTRseq], 1) 
(17,10, U!TDATAind(Dutu, EOT), T, [ PTRseq = (PTRseq + 1) mod 128, PRcredit = PRcredit - 11, 1) 
5.2.2 EF,SM model of the test case. All the transitions of the T-EFSM corresponding to the test case in Figure 
7 are given below. To check if an analysis of the global state space generated from EFSM models of a protocol 
and a test case is useful in detecting parameter errors in test cases, we have intentionally introduced an error 
in the test case EFSM: according to the P-EFSM description, the first DT received by it must have a sequence 
number equal to 0, but in the T-EFSM, the first DT sent has a sequence number 1. 
Initialization: Tsrc-ref = “tester”, Tdsf-ref = “spec”, TRcredit = 0 
(1,2, L!CR(Tsrc-ref, Tdst-ref, Toptionl, TRcredit), T, 0, 1) 
(2,3, Start(A), T, 0, I> 
(3,4, U?OTHERWISE, T, q ,2> 
(3,5, U?TCONi~d(src-ref, Toption2), [src-ref = = Tsrc_ref], q , l> 
(5,6, U!TCONresp(dst-if, Topt~on2), T, a, 1) 
(6,9, ?Timeout, T, 0,2> 
(6,8, L?OTHERWISE, T, q ,3) 
(6, 7, L?CC(src_ref, dst_ref, Topfion3, TScredit), [ src_ref = = Tdst_ref &dst_ref = = Tsrc_ref 1, [ 7Tfieq = 11, 1) 
(7,10, Cancel(A), T, 0, 1) 
(10, 11, L!DT(Tsrc-ref, Tdst_ref, TTRseq, T, “abed”), T, q y 1) 
(11,12, U?OTHERWISE, T, q , 2) 
(11,13, ~?TDATAind(src_ref, Dufa, EOT), [Data = =“ubcd”&EOT= = T], 0, 1) 
(13,14, ~?OTHERW~SE, T, q ,2) 
(13,15, L?AK(src_ref, dst_ref, Seqno, Credit), [Seqno = = TTRseq -t I], U, I> 
(15,16, L!DR(Tsrc_ref, Tdst_ref, some-reason), T, q , 1) 
(16,17, U?OTHERWISE, T, 0, 1) 
(16, 18, U?TDISind(src_ref, some-reason), T, 0, 1) 
(l&19, L?OTHERWISE, T, q ,2) 
(18,20, L?DC(src-ref, dst-ref ), [ src_ref = = Tdsf-refAND dst-ref = = Tsrc-ref ], 0, 1) 
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5.2.3 Generation and analysis of global state space. 
Using Definition 12 of executable transitions in a 
global state, Algorithm 1 was run on the P-EFSM 
and the T-EFSM, described above, to generate a 
global state space. Because of space limitations, we 
have shown only a part of the global state space in 
Figure 8. Values of the variables updated by a 
t~nsition are shown near the transition. Also, the 
predicate associated with a transition is shown near 
the transition as a label. 
After successfully opening a connection, the T- 
EFSM sends a DT PDU with the sequence number 
1 to the P-FSM by putting the message in the 
IDitiSliZStiOn: 
Tsrc_m?f = “testa” 
a 
2 2 E c CR1 E WA) 
kL_ 
L?cR(sIv_~ dst_r&Popti~sucdit) 







[src_ref = Tsrc_refl 
jdst_.mr = pdst_refl 
meq = PTSseq = 0. PRcredit = 1 
-:T-lFSMtmos~ k?-iJ + : P-EFSM transitions 
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channel LO. The predicate associated with the L?DT 
transition in state 10 of the P-EFSM is [(src-ref = = 
Pdst-ref) AND (dst-ref = = Psrc-ref > AND 
(PRcredit( )O) AND (Seq = = PTRseq)], where PR- 
credit is the credit value sent to the T-EFSM, Seq is 
the sequence number in the received DT, and 
PTRseq is the expected sequence number. Since 
PRcredit = 1, the condition (PRcredit( )O) evaluates 
to true. However, Seq = 1 and PTRseq = 0. There- 
fore, (Seq = = PTRseq) evaluates to false and, con- 
sequently, the entire predicate evaluates to false. 
Thus, the transition L?DT is rendered unexecutable 
in state 10 of the P-EFSM and the global state 12 
LBX&m_ref, dst_zef, Toption3, TScmiit) 
[m-r=&== T&_ref& dst_ref = Txc_refJ 
[natul=ll 
(Ihspecitiedreu?ption 
Figure 8. Partial global state space generated from the EFSM descriptions of 
the test case and protocol s~cification. 
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cannot be perturbed using the same transition. Then, 
the P-EFSM nondeterministically outputs a se- 
quence of AK PDUs in state 10 to the channel LO, 
which eventually overflows as seen in the global 
state 18. 
Analysis of the global state space reveals that 
there is an unspecified reception error in global 
state 12. As expected, this reception error occurs 
because transition L?DT in state 10 of the P-EFSM 
cannot be fired because the predicate evaluates to 
false. This unspecified reception error is due to the 
parameter error introduced in the test case. 
6. RELATED RESEARCH 
Two other approaches to test case verification have 
been reported in which the protocol and the test 
case are assumed to be specified in the formal 
description technique LOTOS I131 and TICN [l], 
respectively. 
In the first approach 1141, first both the LOTOS 
specification of a protocol and the ‘ITCN specifica- 
tion of a test case are translated into a common 
semantic model, a chart [15l with FIFO queues 
modeling the communication mechanism between 
the test case and the protocol specification. Next, an 
interleaved symbolic execution mechanism is used to 
compare the behavior of the test chart with the 
protocol chart. A limitation of this approach is that 
only static aspects of a test case can be compared 
with the behavior of a protocol specification and 
.dynamic aspects due to timeouts cannot be verified. 
In the second approach [16], the verification pro- 
cess consists of two steps. First, the TTCN test case 
is translated into a LOTOS specification. Second, a 
test and trace analysis tool called TETRA, based on 
a LOTOS interpreter [17], takes the LOTOS de- 
scriptions of the test case and the protocol specifi- 
cation as inputs and computes their parallel compo- 
sition by tracing the executable paths in the two 
specifications. The concerns expressed about the 
tool are its high space requirement and long verifi- 
cation time. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have developed a simple yet powerful methodol- 
ogy to verify a test case against a protocol specifica- 
tion by using nondeterministic FSM models. It was 
observed that even a simple test case for a basic 
interconnection test in the LS architecture contains 
a few design errors. These were classified as recep- 
tion, blocking reception, and channel overflow er- 
rors. A general notion of a synchronization error in 
the context of deterministic and nondeterministic 
K. Naik and B. Sarikaya 
FSM and EFSM models of protocols was studied. To 
detect such an error and distinguish it from other 
types of errors, it is necessary to analyze the global 
state space. Finally, we modeled a test case and a 
protocol speci~~ation as EFSMs and used the same 
algorithm to generate the global state space. The 
only change required was to define an executable 
transition to take the transition predicates into ac- 
count. 
In protocol validation systems, state explosion can 
be controlled by using the notion of a canonical 
sequence when two processes communicate through 
two channels [18]. However, when two processes 
communicate through more than two channels, it 
has been stated that either a canonical sequence 
does not exist or is very difficult to find. Hence, the 
notion of canonical sequence does not seem to be 
useful in our verification model to control the state 
explosion. It will be interesting to explore other ways 
to control the state explosion problem. 
We have modeled test purposes as regular expres- 
sions. It would be interesting to develop models for 
error types, possibly using temporal logic formulas. 
Such an approach could lead to a semantic model 
for test correctness requirements. 
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